a same geographic precision, to be at (41°17'38.14"N, 129°04'54.21"E). This study demonstrates a strategy of using the scientific evidence registered by a nation's past nuclear tests for high-precision seismic monitoring of its future nuclear test activity and geographic network of nuclear test infrastructure.
Introduction
On May 25, 2009, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) announced, without providing information of exact time, location and yield, that it conducted a second nuclear test. On that day, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) reported detecting a magnitude 4.7 seismic tremor in an aseismic region in North Korea (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/recenteqsww/Quakes/us2009hbaf.php; also archived copy at http://geophysics.geo.sunysb.edu/wen/NK/usgs_north_korea_2009_test.webarchive).
The seismic waveform features recorded at the seismic stations around the globe for the event exhibit characteristics of an explosion. However, the exact location of the test remains elusive.
Seismic monitoring of underground nuclear explosions relies on seismic observations recorded by seismometers around the globe. Because seismic observations are influenced by the seismic properties along the paths of the wave propagation from the source to the seismometers, the accuracy of determination of an event location and time depends on the degree of our knowledge of the seismic properties in the interior of the Earth. The challenges for accurately determining the location of North Korea's nuclear tests lie on the fact that, due to the lack of seismic station and seismicity in the reported by the USGS is about ±3.8 kilometers (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/recenteqsww/Quakes/us2009hbaf.php).
While our knowledge of the seismic structure in the region is unlikely to be improved soon, in this study, we demonstrate a strategy that uses the forensic evidence registered Kim and Richards, 2007 , Zhao et al., 2008 , Koper et al., 2008 . Through extensive search of the seismic data in the public domain, we discover that the 2006 test also registered high-quality seismic record in many seismic stations in the F-net in Japan (Figure 1 ). 
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We use a method developed by Wen [2006] to determine the relative location and origin time of the two tests. The method uses the arrival time difference of a particular seismic phase between a waveform doublet, defined as a pair of seismic events occurring at different times but in close location and exhibiting similar waveforms, to determine the relative location and origin time of the doublet. It is similar to the modern methods using the information between earthquake doublets [e.g., Poupinet et al., 1984; Ito, 1985; Fremont and Malone, 1987; Deichmann and Garcia-Fernandez, 1992; Poupinet et al., 2000; Waldhauser and Ellsworth, 2000; Schaff and Richards, 2004; Zhang et al., 2005] chemical explosions [Phillips, et al., 2001] and nuclear tests [e.g., Waldhauser et al., 2004] . Because the doublets occur very close in location, the relative travel time and waveform difference between the waveform doublets is sensitive primarily to the relative change of event location. Waveform doublets also allow accurate travel time measurement to be made by the waveform cross-correlation technique because of similarities of the waveforms. It is thus a powerful tool for high-precision studies of relative location and time of the doublets. In the present case, North Korea's two tests essentially constitute a nuclear doublet and the additional observational pairs between the two tests discovered in the F-net stations in Japan makes good azimuthal coverage possible for high-precision determination of the relative location of the two tests (Figure 1 ).
Relocation results
The seismic phase we used is the Pn wave, the first arriving compressional wave that diffracts along the Earth's crust-mantle boundary. The travel time differences of the Pn phases between the two tests are obtained by cross-correlating the observed waveforms between the two tests, and are presented in Figure 2a and Table 2 (41°17'38.14"N, 129°4'54.21"E) (Table 1) and is shown on a Google map in Figure 3b . Our relocation results are affected little by the uncertainties of the reference Earth's velocity models we used. Using the Preliminary Earth Reference Model [Dziewonski and Anderson, 1981] or AK135 [Kennett et al., 1995] 
Conclusion
Our study demonstrates that the forensic evidence registered by the past nuclear 41°17'38.14"N, 129°4'54.21E) . This study also, in practice, identifies the seismic coverage needed and available for future monitoring of North Korea's nuclear tests. Since the seismic data we use are in the public domain and can be available in real time, the determination can be made in real time. In the view of modern seismology, it is not just that each new nuclear test a nation conducts would be 9 confidently detected. It would reveal, in real time and high precision, an increasing complete view of geographic network of the nation's nuclear test infrastructure.
